Previous studies (e.g., by Sam Peltzman) reveal powerful share-value effects of Federal Trade Commission (FTC) actions against firms for allegedly false advertising. Curiously, however, when the FTC announces an investigation but simultaneous settlement of the case with the advertiser, no adverse impact results, an empirical finding thus far unexplained. This article uses a recent FTC action, in which the accused advertiser suffered no adverse equity impact, to explain that result. The article focuses on the empirical issue of materiality. Many advertising messages challenged by the FTC are not material to consumers. If not --and especially when, as in the case discussed here, the advertiser had much earlier discontinued the advertising challenged --the advertiser predictably would not suffer. Econometric evidence strongly indicates that the messages the FTC challenged were immaterial to consumers.
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This is a curious result, one that has not been scrutinized. It is examined here, however, through analysis of one recent case that ended with a simultaneous announcement of an FTC complaint and Commission settlement with the advertiser. In 2002, the FTC announced an action against Interstate Bakeries Corporation, Inc. (IBC). It concerned certain television advertising claims for IBC's principal product, Wonder Bread, that the FTC alleged were unsubstantiated. As soon as the investigation was announced, IBC signed a settlement agreement agreeing not to run the challenged ads, which engendered a series of press releases from both sides and ensuing articles in the press. 4 The IBC episode therefore provides an opportunity to observe at an individual-firm level the process described by Peltzman and by Mathios and Plummer. Further, the episode permits, via a single-firm case study, tests of the Peltzman and Mathios-Plummer conclusions concerning simultaneous complaint and settlement in an advertising case. The fundamental questions are whether markets reacted the way that economic science predicts that they would, and why.
Section II begins with a brief description of the FTC's regulation of advertising substantiation, then reviews the Peltzman and Mathios-Plummer studies of FTC advertising regulation, particularly the effects of settling cases. The next section then describes the advertising challenged in the Wonder Bread case, focusing especially on whether that portion of the ads the FTC found objectionable was material to consumers. Section IV presents statistical analyses of the effects on IBC shares of its settlement with the FTC. As will be seen, the outcome is consistent with that found earlier in the large-sample work of Mathios and Plummer: no effect on IBC share value. 3 Section V explains why that result occurred, asking statistically whether the challenged advertising claims were material to consumers. The analysis here is apparently the first to examine materiality in any sophisticated, quantitative fashion. Econometric analysis shows that the ads' challenged message was immaterial to consumers, in that they did not cause consumers to buy more Wonder Bread. This would explain why IBC suffered no share value loss from the case. The lack of materiality also demonstrates that the Commission's action was unnecessary to correct any market failure or to help consumers.
II. The Federal Trade Commission's Regulation of Advertising

A. Ad Substantiation
In safeguarding consumers against "unfair and deceptive acts and practices," the FTC pursues not only advertising it finds deceptive, but (since the early 1970s) ads it believes are unsubstantiated. 5 In the seminal case, 6 the FTC established not only that lack of adequate substantiation constitutes an "unfair" practice, but also that the advertiser has the burden, when challenged, of demonstrating it possessed sufficient substantiation at the time of the advertisement, with sufficiency defined by the Commission. Substantiation is thus an easier way than proving actual falsity for the FTC to proceed against an advertiser. So, substantiation rather than falsity or deception has become the principal focus of FTC advertising regulation. Prior to the advertising claims at issue here, Wonder Bread ads drew attention to its ingredients, and sometimes to the importance of these ingredients for good health and healthy growth.
The FTC staff took issue with ads said to feature certain claims, referred to as the "Neurons" claims. The TV advertising containing the Neurons claims featured Professor Wonder, a zany "nutty professor" type in a white lab coat who advises "Mom" about the benefits of feeding her children Wonder Bread. The "Neurons" claim concerned Wonder Bread's calcium content.
In the advertising, Professor Wonder looks into a child's ear with an otoscope, and with him viewers see lethargic children dressed as neurons inside the child's brain. Upon eating a slice of Wonder Bread, though, the "neurons" immediately dance frenetically to cries of "let's go do our homework." 13 According to the FTC, the Wonder Bread snack was portrayed as working a miracle, with the allegedly clear message that eating Wonder Bread will immediately make you smarter. As a matter of fact, calcium is necessary to facilitate the transmission of neurons in the brain. But it appears that the calcium used there comes from other parts of the body (e.g., the bones), which in turn absorb calcium from a person's diet. Thus, while dietary calcium is an ultimate source of calcium in the brain, the time between ingestion and appearance in the brain neurons is not immediate.
IBC maintained that its ads were designed just to highlight the enhanced calcium content in Wonder Bread, which would be stored in the body and ultimately be usable in the brain. Calcium enrichment in Wonder Bread was a fact not challenged by the government, and could easily have been substantiated by IBC had it been. The company denied, however, that it intended to convey any message that the effect of ingesting calcium is immediate. The Professor Wonder ads were intended to be fanciful, and it is not obvious that the targeted moms would find in the Neurons message the sort of scientific claim the FTC insisted it conveyed. Nonetheless, based on its own interpretation of the Neurons claim, the FTC staff accused IBC of lacking adequate substantiation of immediate calcium impact when IBC ran the ads.
In effect, the FTC faulted IBC for failing to substantiate a claim IBC did not think it was making. Advertisers, particularly those selling a repeat-purchase product like bread, are not indifferent to the message they convey. IBC had worked with its ad agency to ascertain what viewers took away from its advertising. Nor would such a scientific message of immediate impact be necessary for IBC to find it profitable to run the ads.
For two reasons, economic rather than scientific, one would expect ex ante that the Professor Wonder advertising in question might have a positive influence on sales. First, regardless of its message, the fact of advertising informs viewers of the brand's continued existence, indicating long-term success in the market and reminding them therefore of the considerable brand-9 name capital at stake should the product fail to satisfy. Second, the advertising in question contains more than the complained-of calcium claim. Wonder Bread's message in the challenged ads, again reinforcing its advertising over many decades, is that the bread simply is good for you.
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Whatever message the ads imparted, however, IBC itself had already found ex post that Professor Wonder was a dud. The Professor Wonder ads had been designed to run for about a year, but IBC decided shortly after they aired that they were ineffective. After running for only eight to ten weeks in the latter half of 2000, the ads were pulled.
Although the ads had ceased appearing months earlier, the FTC launched an investigation, demanding to know what substantiation supported the messages that the Commission lawyers contended the ads conveyed. IBC presented substantiation for the claims that it believed the ads made, but these were not the claims as the FTC interpreted them. When IBC was unsuccessful in convincing the FTC lawyers as to what the ads truly communicated, the FTC indicated it was ready to file a complaint against IBC for lack of substantiation. IBC then agreed (without admitting wrongdoing) to a consent order in which it promised not to run the ads it had already discontinued a year earlier.
IV. Capital-Market Effects of the FTC Case Against IBC
The IBC case resulted in a simultaneous announcement by the FTC that (a) it had investigated the Wonder Bread claims --as the FTC interpreted them --and had found them unsub- Legally, materiality is supposedly something of concern to the FTC when it decides whether to challenge an ad. 22 Economically, an advertisement's "materiality" is measured by whether it causes a shift of a product's demand curve. But whether an ad has shifted the product demand curve is an issue of fact, about which the Commission's lawyers have no particular expertise or methodological skills for evaluating. 23 With appropriate data, however, materiality is measurable. The data reveal, in fact, that IBC was right: its advertising message challenged by the FTC had no impact on sales. Professor Wonder's message was immaterial to consumers.
B. Testing for Materiality
To gauge the materiality of the Wonder Bread claims, we determined econometrically whether the ads containing the challenged Neurons claims raised sales more than did similar Wonder Bread advertising not containing these claims. Thus, in effect, we compared sales of Wonder Bread when there was advertising without the contested Neurons claims ("baseline" advertising) with sales when there was advertising including those claims. The comparison was 22 In recent litigation over advertising substantiation, a principal issue was materiality of ads for pain-killer Doan's Pills. Novartis Corporation v. FTC, 223 F.3d 783 (D.C. Cir. 1999). The Commission had held that Doan's efficacy claims were material and that evidence of Doan's advertising being ineffective in conveying the superior efficacy of its product was irrelevant. The Commission opined that failure to increase market share did not imply the irrelevance of advertising. The ten years of advertising may have helped Doan's maintain share in a highly competitive market and, in any case, Doan's spent substantially less on advertising than its analgesic rivals. The FTC likewise said it was dubious that a corporation would have spent millions over ten years for ineffective advertising just to appease retailers who demanded advertising from niche brands. Finally, said the Commission, myriad factors affect market performance, and Novertis' expert had not controlled for these in concluding that Doan's market share had remained static notwithstanding its advertising of the efficacy claims. . 23 As Peltzman points out, "there should be no presumption that false ads which happen to be detected by the FTC are typically successful." Peltzman, supra note __, at 410-11.
possible because some of some of the baseline advertising actually used Professor Wonder, but without the Neurons claims.
The Model
The following demand curve for Wonder Bread sales volume (WBV) was estimated:
( where i and t refer to city i (one of 21 cities) and week t (from one in the first week of June 1998
to 153 for the first week in June 2001). The independent variable definitions appear in Table 3 . Also, as concerns the advertising stock variable, that stock (unlike a firm's physical plant) cannot be observed directly. However, advertising expenditures accumulate over time to determine this stock; as with physical capital, this stock is depleted if it is not replenished with new, additional advertising expenditure. 25 We assume that the advertising stocks at issue here depreciate at a constant weekly rate, λ. If we apply a Koyck transformation to equation (1), it becomes (2) log(WBV it ) = λ log(Q it-1 ) + RHS of equation (1) Table 4 provides the long-run coefficient estimates, the asterisks indicating levels of statistical significance. 27 The Koyck transformation applied here creates an errors-in-variables problem, the stochastic residual being correlated with the lagged dependent variable. In addition, if the errors are serially correlated, the estimation difficulties are compounded. To deal with these issues, two alternative estimation methods were used: a simple instrumental variables tech- 26 The demand relation in equation (2) nique and a more complex method proposed by Hatanaka. 28 Method 1 of Table 4 refers to the Hatanaka two-step method, and Method 2 refers to the simple instrumental variable method outlined in Kmenta.
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The coefficients of determination are quite high, over .95 regardless of specification, suggesting that all important influences on Wonder Bread sales have been included in the model.
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The results are generally as would be expected. Notably, a handful of variables for both IBC and its rivals (prices, merchandising, couponing and advertising) explain the vast bulk of the variation in Wonder Bread sales. Individually, almost all of the variable coefficients have the predicted signs and are statistically significant, except for private label price.
And crucially, except for the Neurons advertising. The coefficient for that variable actually is negative, although statistically insignificant from zero. Thus, using standard levels of significance and ordinary concepts of hypothesis testing, one cannot reject the null hypothesis that the Neurons claims had no effect on sales. 31 The econometrics validate the decision by IBC to pull the Professor Wonder Neurons ads: they cost money, and did not increase sales. Judged empirically, whether by econometricians or by bakers, the ads were immaterial. 29 If dollar sales were used as the dependent variable the results would be identical to those in Table 4 , except for the coefficient on own price. See note __, supra. 30 In Table 4 , the coefficients reported for baseline and Neurons advertising reflect weight corresponding to the average weekly TRPs that IBC purchases for local spot TV advertising. 31 That is, if the FTC were required to prove materiality, it could not falsify the null hypothesis of no materiality.
Indeed, the insignificant coefficient for PWNadv coefficient is negative, in effect meaning that any positive impact of the Neurons ads would be of trivial magnitude.statistically. As demonstrated next, one can reject with substantial confidence the null hypothesis that these claims had any important positive effect on Wonder Bread sales.
C. Materiality and the Public Interest Standard
The very meaning of materiality was disputed in this case. IBC maintained that if the advertising claims in question did not cause any significant number of consumers to purchase more Wonder bread than usual, the claims were immaterial. And, as materiality is supposedly a necessary element under the FTC's ad substantiation doctrine, lack of materiality would mean there is no cause of action under the FTC's standards. In effect, "no harm, no foul."
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In contrast, the FTC attorneys maintained that the claims were inherently material. According to the FTC staff's interpretation of the Wonder Bread claims, they must be material, or they would not have been made. 33 According to the FTC, the contested ads' claim that by eating a slice of Wonder Bread, a child could immediately concentrate better and more effectively do his homework. Under this interpretation, the explanation for the econometric results in Table 4 showing no sales effect, was because: (1) the chosen advertising vehicle failed to deliver the message effectively, (2) the econometrics were deficient; or (3) statistical evidence doesn't matter since lawyers know what is material.
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In addition, the FTC economists were critical of the interpretation of the econometric results shown in Table 4 . 35 They indicated that failure to falsify the null hypothesis of no sales ef-32 Moreover, consumers presumably care little about the substantiation inputs that go into an ad, as long as claims made are truthful. 33 As one FTC staffer involved with the Wonder Bread case wrote two years later, "Of course the ads are going to affect demand for the advertiser's product -why else would the companies run them?" Butters, in his Reply to Higgins and McChesney, supra note __, at 24. Butters continues, "we presume that the firm was successful in conveying the claim and that the claim was material to consumers." Of course, IBC's experience with the Professor Wonder ads was exactly the opposite: the ads were not successful, and so were discontinued before the FTC even started its investigation. 34 As one lawyer put it, the question was whether "incompetent advertising justifies lack of a reasonable basis." 35 Involving economists in case evaluations and proceedings is now an essential part of the FTC process. In this case, the FTC economists concurred with the lawyers' interpretation of the claims, and that the claims must be ma-
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fect was insufficient proof of no effect. The Commission puts the burden of proving no effect on the respondent, a problem for statisticians encountered elsewhere in law where the burden of proving zero effect is on defendants. 36 Of course, proving a negative is impossible, but ordinarily failure to reject the null hypothesis of no effect is accepted in economics as sufficient to end the argument, barring contrary evidence. D. Materiality and Endogeneity terial because they were made. The economists reviewed the econometric analysis of materiality here, were given the data to review, verify and redo the econometrics, but never produced a model disproving the results in Table 4 .
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The foregoing discussion helps address a second question raised by the Mathios-Plummer results concerning simultaneous FTC announcements and consents, results corroborated here for Wonder Bread specifically. In the Mathios-Plummer sample, some 16 percent of the consents were signed after the announcement of the investigation. Those firms, as noted above, suffered a five-day loss in share value of 2.5 percent, a loss not recovered when the consent was signed. If consenting when an investigation is announced means avoidance of share value loss, why doesn't every firm just consent at that time?
That question has at least two answers. First, in some cases the Commission decides unilaterally whether to announce an investigation. The advertiser therefore may not have a chance
to settle the matter with a consent simultaneous with the Commission's announcement.
Second, and perhaps more important, the fact that the sample firms settling at the time of the investigation announcement suffered no equity loss does not mean that other firms in the sample would have fared the same, had they also consented. In the Wonder Bread case, for example, IBC was also convinced that consumers did not understand the ads' message the way the FTC insisted they did. The bakery was adamant that the ads' messages as interpreted by the FTC were not material, despite the Commission's insistence they were. And finally, believing the ads were ineffective, IBC had pulled them a year before the Commission publicly announced its investigation.
Being required to stop an ineffective and immaterial ad campaign that has already been discontinued would hardly be costly, as compared to a case when a firm felt its message as understood by consumers was material and the ads were ongoing and effective. In that latter case, a firm would be more inclined to litigate, both to defend itself against the allegations of wrongdoing and to preserve the ability to run the successful ads. In fact, the very act of choosing to 21 contest the FTC's allegation would typically allow the firm to continue running the ad. 37 In short, the Mathios-Plummer results should not be understood as establishing an optimal strategy for all firms, but rather evidence of firm's rationally maximizing its value through self-sorting.
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E. So Why Bother?: Alternative Hypotheses
The foregoing raises one final question. Why did the Commission devote resources to pursuing IBC? The Commission brought an action against a well-known brand, Wonder Bread, on the basis of ads that ran only a few weeks, and had been voluntarily discontinued well before the government opened its investigation, because they were ineffective. Econometric evidence presented here and provided to the FTC staff at the time indicates that there was no consumer harm because, as IBC had learned the hard way in the marketplace, the ads had no effect on consumer purchases.
In effect, the FTC moved in to "solve" a problem the market had already corrected voluntarily. It imposed a non-penalty on the advertiser who had already corrected the problem, and thus achieved no benefit. One might well ask, why bother? Although that question falls outside the principal discussion here concerning materiality, alternative hypotheses suggest themselves.
In effect, invoking a public-interest explanation for regulation, FTC staff sometimes fall back on the argument that their cases are important, not just in remedying the problem at hand, Analogously, as a matter of economics, it is costly to pursue advertisers; yet if the ads are non-material, there are no benefits. 39 Imposing liability when there is no harm is overdeterrence, raising the likelihood that future advertisers will eschew advertising that in fact was not harmful. The public interest is harmed, not served, by costly regulation that achieves no benefits, and may chill future beneficial advertising.
Regulation that does not correct any market failure, and imposes costs in excess of any benefits, is often better explained by the economic theory of regulation. That now-familiar model considers whether regulation not pursued in the public interest is nonetheless in the personal interest of particular parties. Explaining apparently misguided regulation must in particular include a reckoning of gains to the regulators themselves. 40 Ceteris paribus, budgetmaximizing government agencies seek visible output. 41 The Wonder Bread case may have meant little for consumers, but it served the goals of the FTC regulators themselves. In particular, the Commission was pursuing a "national adver- Table 4 Constant and city dummies not reported. ** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level. * Statistically significant at the 5 percent level. # The standard error is reported in parenthesis.
